pOSTWAR Japanese scholarship, in its quest to explain Japan's modern h has yet to deal adequately with the so-called right wing. Survey histo times write it off as a lunatic fringe, or equate it simply with militaris schism.' My purpose here is not to venture a total picture of the right but to microcosmic analysis of doctrines attributed to it through focusing on the revolution formulated early in the Taishl5 period by Kita Ikki (I883-I937 writers regularly identify Kita as a leading rightist. Maruyama Masao refer as "the ideological father of Japanese fascism,"2 and his I919 book on the "r tion" of Japan (later published as Nihon kaiza hoan taik6) has been calle Osamu "the Mein Kampf of the Sh5wa ultranationalist movement."3 It is my contention, however, that the complexity of Kita's theory of re raises a question as to whether terms like right and left are really useful fo ing Japanese thinkers in the early twentieth century. Left-right analysis o the French Revolution and later spread to other Western nations, servin nate certain broad lines of political orientation: right signifies a desire existing institutions and strengthen traditional social ties, especially patriot family bonds, while left suggests a willingness to welcome change and large-scale reform sponsored by government in the affairs of the people.4 most commonly associated with lower-class support, whereas upper-cla back rightist causes. Both are ipso facto capable of transformation from mo extreme forms of belief and action in order to achieve their goals.5 Accepti criteria as fairly typical assumptions about the political continuum, we may ticipating our conclusions-that Kita Ikki does not fit the standard pict right. I doubt that any such label is useful for understanding his signif thinker. Modern Japanese intellectual history demands explanation b to a self-styled concept of form in Japan, he crossed over to the mainland of Asia as an adventurer-a "Shina R5nin" connected with the Kokuryfikai.7 He witnessed the momentous changes that took place there during the next two years and left a detailed narrative of what happened in a book called Shina kakumei gaishi (A private history of the Chinese Revolution), which he circulated in I9I5-I9i6, "in large type so it would be easy to read for old men with glasses"-the genro and bureaucrats who decided Japan's foreign policy.8 By relating the Chinese situation to other modern revolutions, he produced a comparative history of revolution which is unique in Japanese thought up to that time. His theory also drove him to a fierce critique of the contemporary state of affairs in Japan itself.
In a recent survey of the concept of revolution, J. S. Er6s denotes three prevailing interpretations: optimistic-progressive, holding that revolution is "good" and a sign of inevitable progress; pessimistic-conservative, opposing it as a form of regression to barbarism; and neutral-scientific, representing recent social scientific attempts to look at revolution from a value-free standpoint.9 Kita Ikki, who was familiar with the Social Darwinist attitudes of late nineteenth-century European thought, may be said to have taken the optimistic-progressive point of view. He rejected all cyclical notions of history and upheld the idea that history proceeds in a straight line leading ultimately to the mutation of mankind into "godkind" at the end of an inevitable process of social evolution.Y? This philosophy received elaboration in his first book, Kokutairon oyobi junsei shakaishugi (The national-polity myth and pure socialism), written in I906, where he drew an explicit analogy between biological evolution and the growth of human society as a basis for a new and linear interpretation of Japanese history.
To Kita, however, progress along the straight line of history came about at an uneven pace. Revolution sometimes became necessary to overcome obstacles placed in evolution's way by ruling groups whose methods characterized the preceding stage of history but were now outmoded. We may summarize his theory of revolution by examining five points which he felt all revolutions had in common.
First, revolution itself does not consist of sudden or violent change. "Revolution is not the outcome of the fires of battle, but a war of ideas."" It is never to be equated with simple power struggles. "If we say that bloodshed constitutes revolution, we must conclude that there have been countless revolutions within [Japan's] imperial 6 Kita's youth receives detailed treatment in English at the hands of Harris Inwood Martin, "The Early Life and Thought of Kita Ikki," unpubl. diss. (Stanford University, I959). There is a sound biography in Japanese: Tanaka Sogor6, Kita Ikki: Nihonteki fuashisuto no shocho (Tokyo: Miraisha, I959). 7 Kita's connection with the Kokuryuikai was apparently neither so intimate nor so enduring as some have surmised. If he ever formally became a member, he did not remain one for long. Tanaka, p. I43, says that "Kita went to Shanghai [in October I9iI] as the first to be dispatched by the Kokuryuikai." However, as one of the official Kokuryuikai histories notes, his relationship to the organization was that of a "guest member" (kyakubun) whose function in I9I0-I9II was to edit the monthly publication, liji gekkan. Kuzuu Yoshihisa, Toa senkaku shishi kiden, II (Tokyo: Kokuryuikai, I935), 438. Kita soon ceased to share the interests of Kokuryakai leaders Uchida Ry65hei and T6yama Mitsuru. Third, modern revolution has the effect of liberat ing birth to a "citizen state" (kamin kokkaa) whos call "social democratic." "'Social democracy' . . . mean power to all the elements of the state." '-5 This exten the right to vote but also the right of the people in concentrations of land and capital formerly belon ownership still exists, but limited nationalization of of society from the tyranny and poverty impos would eventually reach this evolutionary stage, n another but as a result of the "liberal awakening countries of Asia were, therefore, not destined to co go through changes ordained by universal evolut means a temporal wave flowing from past to pre that divides East and West."'8
The fourth point concerns the agents of revolutio awakening that signals the advent of social democrac ing groups never revolutionize themselves. "As the s no revolution past or present has ever come from sary for a self-conscious elite to gain military suppo fill the change in values that has already taken p elite acts as the vanguard of the nation as a whole, a lar class. His theory thus differs from the Marxist specifies no distinctive class base.
The fifth and last point is that revolution is strict ternal pressure on a society might trigger a release revolution, foreign intervention could only bring g ing national consolidation.20 Attempts merely to throw off foreign oppression per se are not revolutions at all. Kita hesitated to apply the term to the American War of Independence, for instance, because in his opinion it was "a by-product of international strife between England and France," motivated not by internal change of values but by desire to escape from British rule and find "perpetual neutrality."'" He drew his favorite examples of modern revolution from France, Japan (the Meiji
Restoration is always the "restoration revolution"), and China (the Hsinhai Revolution of I9II). He also anticipated further revolutionary activity in Russia and later fitted the I9I7 Revolution into his conceptual scheme.22
In the end, Kita's theory remains no more systematic than the above summary indicates. It was impossible, he felt, to achieve a completely intellectual definition. Instead, he defined revolution in terms of a phrase taken from the Hokeky6 or Lotus Suatra, the canon of the Nichiren sect of Buddhism: "Revolution means entry into the law of the unity of loyalty and treason" (jungyaku juji no h5monb), since in
the revolutionary vortex what is loyal from one standpoint may equally be traitorous from another. The theory of revolution, he added, "cannot be set down in writing"
(furyui monjic-a characteristic Zen expression) but must be apprehended intuitively.23 Having made these somewhat ambiguous statements, he nevertheless suggested that it was possible to understand revolution by the comparative method of citing similarities and differences among a number of revolutionary situations. Chinese, meanwhile, it was Japan's new nationalism that contributed to the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty and, more importantly, "awakened their own Eastern spirit."25 Each of these revolutionizing societies owed a debt to foreign ideas, even though outside participation only created havoc and foreigners generally misinterpreted the revolution as a vulgar outburst of mob violence. He criticized Burke for "not understanding the revolution across the Channel" just as he ridiculed Japanese policymakers and adventurers for their ignorance of real circumstances in China.26
Kita attacked all pre-revolutionary reform movements as futile attempts to breathe new life into anachronistic institutions. In Japan, the k5bugattai effort to reconcile the Tokugawa government and the imperial court had to give way to intransigent antiBakufu hostility in the form of the Satsuma-Ch5bshfi sonno movement. In China, the In China, military forces were necessary to fulfill the revolution, just as Satsuma and Choshui troops had played a crucial role in the Meiji Restoration. These forces had to be drawn from the lower ranks, for officers of battalion command and above were part of the "unawakened" existing order and therefore not trustworthy. In
Kita's view "lower samurai" had carried out Japan's Restoration, and in China the revolutionary elite in concert with lower military officers had brought about the fall of the Ch'ing.28
By drawing these analogies, Kita intended to predict the future course of events in China. He was certain that "in the end the Chinese Revolution must go the [same] way as France and Japan," and in part it was well advanced in this direction.29 The war of ideas had been won as soon as Chinese nationalism rose to the point where the alien and outdated Ch'ing dynasty became untenable. The slogan "p'ai Man hsing
Han" (down with the Manchus and up with the Chinese) was comparable to "sonno tobaku" (revere the emperor and destroy the Bakufu) in the Restoration, and by extension to "liberte, egalite, fraternite" as well.30 These were all nationalist demands decrying the parochialism of the ancien regime and heralding popular liberation and power through national unification.
But the Chinese Revolution required a period of consolidation such as the Meiji emperor and Napoleon had presided over in Japan and France. Who would emerge as China's "great unifier?" As Japan had rejected the disunified federative system of the bakuhan regime in favor of centralized monarchic rule, China must now abandon its age-old monarchic order, which had fostered regionalism, and replace it with a "republic" headed by a "lifetime president" possessing overwhelming military power and absolute authority. Yuan Shih-k'ai was unsuited to this role, not only because he had played "comprador to the English," but also because he represented the old and corrupt Ch'ing bureaucracy. China needed a new Ogotai, son of Genghis and grand khan of all the Mongols from I229 to I24I.31 Who could act this part remained uncertain. Unification also demanded the appearance of a Carnot, the "organizer of victory" who had built new French military forces to support unity under the revolutionary regime. Yamagata Aritomo had been the Carnot of the Meiji for an example of a distinctive form of "Eastern republicanism" comparable to the unique "Eastern monarchism" which he felt Japan's imperial institution represented. He thought he found it in the system by which the Mongol chieftains chose their leader. "China's republicanism . . . is based on the mandate of heaven and the people's will. .. . 'Eastern republicanism' means a republican form of government ... such as that in which Ogotai Khan clearly became lifetime president (shtishin daisoto), elected by all the khans assembled with their weapons before the gods" (ibid., p. I58).
Restoration, and someone must fill this capacity in China as soon as possible.3
These diverse and sometimes fanciful analogies suggest that Kita tried to force the Chinese Revolution into too procrustean a bed. Perhaps his greatest error in interpreting it stemmed from a correct but exaggerated perception of divisions within the revolutionary movement itself. Since he believed that revolution was generated inside a society and that direct translation of foreign ideas and institutions or the intervention of foreign powers could only serve to frustrate it, he distrusted Sun Yat-sen's Kwangtung "internationalist" group and its "American-style" republicanism. Sun, he said, did not really understand the revolution and was not its true representative.33 This role he assigned instead to the Hunanese "nationalist" group around Sung Chiao-jen. Organizer of the Kuomintang and its initial parliamentary election victory of I9I2-I9I3, Sung seemed destined for greatness until in March, I9I3, Yuan Shihk'ai and his prime minister, Chao Ping-chiin, arranged to have him assassinated. Kita soon arrived at the unlikely conclusion that the "chief culprit" was Sun Yat-sen's close associate Ch'en Ch'i-mei, in league with Sun himself, and that Yuan was merely an "accomplice."34 Sung's murder at the hands of his own fellow revolutionaries, arising out of quarrels over strategy, reminded Kita of the destruction of Saig6 Takamori in the I877 Satsuma Rebellion by the very Meiji government he had done so much to create. Both of these events initiated a period of Thermidorean reaction which threatened the revolution. Convinced that these same Thermidorean elements still blocked progress in Japan and that they stood totally opposed to the Chinese Revolution, he turned his attention increasingly to the problem of how to "reorganize" Japanese society.
Though temperamentally unsuited to the role of a charismatic leader who could mobilize the masses, Kita did conceive of himself as a provider of revolutionary strategy for such leaders. He wrote that he had been "born to a mission as a revolutionary to divide eras and transform the beliefs and institutions of centuries."35 And in Nihon kaiza hoan taika he put forward a detailed set of plans for revolution, holding that the Meiji Restoration had been betrayed by reactionaries around the throne. Saig6's "second revolution" had failed in I877, and now a third attempt should be made.
There were two specific goals in Kita's revolutionary program: to bring oligarchic rule to an end and to reestablish true union between sovereign and populace. He saw the emperor as a national symbol acting in the name of Japan, who together with the people's representatives in the Diet constituted the "highest organ of the state."36 He first expressed this view in his I906 book, after hearing Minobe Tatsukichi lecture 32 Ibid., p. I72. Kita detested Yamagata as an arch-foe of the Chinese Revolution and an obstacle to progress in Japan. By I92I he was calling him "the Rasputin of Odawara" (ibid., p. v). 35 KICSS, II, 360. Hashikawa Bunz6 remarks that Kita did manifest some of the traits Max Weber set forth in describing charisma: "Kita's case may fit halfway into the types of prophet and demagogue"; "Sh6wa chokokkashugi no shos6," Ch6kokkashugi, Vol. XXXI of Gendai Nihon shis6 taikei (Tokyo: Chikuma Shob6, I964), p. 35. 36KICSS, [231] [232] on the organ theory.37 Kita contended that "legally, Japan since the Restoration has been a social democracy," because the people had become citizens rather than subjects.38 But the Meiji oligarchy, by arrogating all power to itself and denying full popular representation, had frustrated this ideal. "Modern Japan is a medieval state mixing East and West, joining a decayed trunk to a rotten root. Worms breed in a corpse, and the plump worms oozing from the corpse of the restoration revolution are the so-called genro."39 To correct the situation, he prescribed universal manhood suffrage. A new and more representative Diet could then overrule the bureaucracy and legislate away the "economic daimyo class" of the zaibatsu who thrived in collusion with it.40 A coup d'etat was necessary to accomplish these ends, to be carried out by an enlightened civilian elite with the aid of the armed forces. This was a strategy which, as we have seen, Kita's Chinese experiences plus his interpretation of the Meiji Restoration recommended to him, and it later endeared him to reform-minded younger officers in the army, although unlike most of them he never envisioned a permanent military dictatorship. The Diet was the legislative arm of Japanese government, and under its aegis various kinds of social reform should be undertaken to produce a wealthy and powerful nation capable of competing on equal terms with the modern West.41
Kita's rereading of Meiji fukoku kyhei aims applied also to the external sphere.
Like the Meiji liberals, he hoped to see the peoples of Asia freed from the yoke of Western imperialism. The worst aspect of Japanese foreign policy, from his point of view, was its pandering emulation of Western imperialist methods. Prime Minister Okuma's plan for Anglo-Japanese collaboration to build a new China seemed to him nothing but slavish imitation of Western ideas, ignoring China's ability to remake itself by thoroughly prosecuting its own national awakening. Instead of playing imperialist politics in the chaos of early Republican China, Japanese foreign policy should construct an Asian Monroe doctrine to protect the Chinese from outside intervention while their own revolution moved toward completion. For this reason Japan needed to break off the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and go to war with Great Britain, whose predatory interests threatened the future development of both China and India. By forcing the British back to Suez, Japan could give these nations an opportunity to grow in peace. But to secure its eastern flank, Japan should conclude an economic alliance with the United States and do everything possible to foster Anglo-American animosity.42
Kita warned that unless his proposals were heeded, Japan would face on the one hand a hostile phalanx of Western nations and on the other an alienated China which would never forgive his countrymen for practicing imperialism at the expense of the Chinese Revolution.43 There is a certain prophetic accuracy in this warn-37 Ibid., p. 247. Kita here credited Minobe with the idea of the emperor as an organ of the state, but he explicitly disagreed with Minobe in arguing that the "highest organ of the state" was not the emperor alone, but the emperor plus the Diet (ibid., pp. 23I-234).
38 Ibid., p. 37I. 39 Ibid., II, vi. 40 Ibid., I, 404. 41 Ibid., II, Nihon kaiz6 hoan taik,, especially Chs. i-vi. 42 Ibid., vii, go, pp. 202, 212. ing, and no doubt he intend role to that of Nichiren in century.44 By 1937, when complicity in the insurrec was rapidly gathering force Despite the recent appear articles dealing with Kita, an ultranationalist fanatic leading. However bleak his zation may seem, the fact r lectuals an urge to reform check or reverse its cours Kita looked favorably upon of representative parliame represents an extension of socialist tradition as well. Where Kita departed from the imitative or "westerniz zation and utopia lay not in deliberate emulation of those societies which had advanced farther on the evolutionary scale, but in a process of self-genesis through national awakening. In this sense he may be labeled a second-generation modern Japanese intellectual, who, like his Meiji predecessors, was influenced by Western ideas, but unlike so many of them saw no reason why Japan should continue to mimic Western ways. His socialism was strictly his own. He favored "building socialism in one country," a peculiarly Japanese form of socialism based on indigenous traditions and needs, rather than blindly following whatever line the Socialist International happened to lay down.46 He identified individual freedom under an egalitarian socialism with national liberation and equality, interpreting Japan's victory over Russia in I905, for example, not as a capitalist war for profit and empire but as a nationalist symbol that lit a torch of hope for China and all the countries of Asia.47
We have seen, then, that Kita's theory of revolution shows evidence of strong Western influence. Having read such writers as Rousseau, Kant, Darwin, Spencer and Marx, he put forth a linear and optimistic doctrine of historical progress. Like Marx, he saw revolution as a "locomotive of history," driving society through rocky stretches of reaction along the road to eventual perfection. And, as Lenin would say later in the same decade, it could connote national as well as class liberation. But 44 Ibid., pp. lii_iiv, [203] [204] 45 Kuno and Tsurumi, Ch. iv: "Nihon no ch6kok Kuno Osamu, "Chokokkashugi no ichi genkei-Kita Vol. IV of Kindai Ni/hon shisoshi kcza (Tokyo: Chik "Kokuminteki shimeikan no shoruikei to sono toku Ikki," Sekai no naka no Nihon, Vol. VIII of Kindai N Kazumi, "Kita Ikki," Hangyakusha no shozo, ed. Ma hitobito (Tokyo: Kodansha, I963), pp. 340-414 M shakaishugi-Gerutsen [Herzen] to Kita Ikki," Bur Takeo (Tokyo: Chikumna Shobo, I964), pp. 42I-434. 46 Kuno Osamu, "Kita Ikki; kakumei no jissenka," Asahi janaru, V (June 23, I963), 99. 47 KICSS, I, [433] [434] II, 360. class counted for little in Kita's calculations, an Western models. The consciousness of class con nence in nineteenth-century Europe is virtuall meaningless to characterize his ideas according to a We may do better by recognizing that the To influenced Kita every bit as much as modern W stressed the need for mutually harmonious functi nized status groups in society. Kogakusha Ogyf quoted as saying: "The peasant cultivates the f the artisan makes utensils and has the people use t one has for what one has not and so helps the p orders will not arise. Though each performs o other; if even one of the four is lacking, a countr attitude has no place for class conflict, yet it does may even be desirable so long as all groups in equilibrium. Similarly, Kita's plan for restoring h as it experienced the tensions of rapid change rev class, but "all the people" must gain by the rev resemblance to the Taisho liberal Yoshino Saku philosophical basis in the Mencian concept of t good government. Though their methods differed versal suffrage and the abolition of oligarchic pre improve the lot of the entire populace. Yoshin purely legal means, whereas Kita perhaps plac vague dictum about the people's "right of revoluti 48 Nor does Kita fit Lipset's category of "right extremism subsumed under one of the other two categories of extremi ground, after all, was middle-class, and members of his fam in the mid-Meiji period. He did oppose "big business, trade-u in the ordinary meanings of those terms. But by his own st rejected any of them. Nor was he a spokesman for "small anticlerical sections of the professional classes"-the social ba Lipset's model (ibid.). At any rate, Japan was incapable of "ce it was not a country "characterized by both large-scale capit p. I35). Kita comes closer to "left extremism," which for anarchist movements but those of "nationalist army officers stroying the corrupt privileged strata" (ibid., p. I30). Certain just such a movement. The young officers who took part in great admiration for his ideas, however much they might d 
